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Abstract 
Based on our analysis, K-MAX is an attractive alternative to current methods 
of resupply. These findings led to our conclusion that the K-MAX is a program 
worthy of DoD investment and of becoming a program of record. 
The concept for the utilization of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capability in 
support of logistics in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is in response to a United 
States Marine Corps urgent needs requirement. This capability significantly 
decreases the ground convoy requirement. In addition, the introduction of UAS 
would reduce American forces' exposure to exterior enemy threats while conducting 
resupply missions.  
The Cargo UAS (CUAS) program is a Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) initiative. The Marines' main interest in the program is the ability 
to have a system that can operate autonomously beyond line of sight with GPS en 
route waypoint navigation and be controlled remotely at designated cargo delivery 
locations.  
The purpose of this study is to estimate potential cost savings in the form of 
resource human life valuations. This study conducts a business case analysis (BCA) 
comparing the estimated costs of the UAS program to the current methods for 
providing logistical support through traditional ground convoys and fixed and rotary 
wing assets.  
Keywords: Business Case Analysis (BCA), Cargo Unmanned Aircraft 
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A. Purpose of the Study 
This study provides a business case analysis (BCA) that compares the 
estimated costs of procuring, operating, and sustaining either the Boeing A160T 
Hummingbird or the Lockheed Martin K-MAX unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) 
with the costs of the status quo of cargo replenishment currently used by the 
United States Marine Corps in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In 
the types of operations these Marines are currently conducting, “there is an 
unusual and compelling urgency for a cargo unmanned aircraft systems [CUAS] 
capability in support of the Marine Corps forces engaged in [OEF]” (Director, 
Combat Development and Integration, 2010).  
The enemy’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has greatly 
affected truck mobility throughout the battlefield and has been successful in 
disrupting current replenishment procedures. Replenishment procedures have 
slowed down due to lengthy, deliberate routes and time-consuming IED 
clearance tactics. In addition, these delays increase the time Marines are 
exposed to enemy attack. One extreme example follows: “a recent [Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade Alpha] MEB-A resupply convoy consisting of 30 vehicles 
took 54 hours and struck three IEDs, each causing the loss of a vehicle—two 
[mine resistant ambush protected] MRAPs vehicles and one [logistics vehicle 
system] LVS” (Marine Forces Central Command, 2009). 
As requested by Program Management Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) 266 (PMA-266), the tactical unmanned aerial system program office at 
NAVAIR, we accomplish the following in this study:  
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 examine the reduction of time Marines spend vulnerable to attack, 
asset re-allocation, cost savings, and additional associated benefits 
gained by the acquisition and operation of CUAS in theater;  
 conduct a BCA with a baseline analysis, sensitivity analysis, and 
risk analysis;  
 compare the performances of the armored medium tactical vehicle 
replacement (MTVR), high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 
(HMMWV), CH-53E, and KC-130J with joint precision airdrop 
system (JPADS) against both the Lockheed Martin K-MAX and the 
Boeing A160T Hummingbird in five operational scenarios 
performing resupply every three days, as well as estimate life cycle 
costs that will include investment costs and  operating costs; and 
 As stated by a NAVAIR representative in CRUSER News in May 2011, the 
current effort will result in one system being deployed following a Quick Reaction 
Assessment (QRA) in August 2011. The requirement for a CUAS is based on a 
joint urgent operational need to counter risks from IEDs. The intent is to reduce 
the number of trucks delivering supplies to forward operating bases (FOBs). 
Following the QRA, one supplier will be fielded for a six-month military utility 
assessment in Afghanistan where CONOPS will be refined and the system’s 
operation value will be evaluated (Pratson, 2011, p. 4). 
B. Problem Statement 
There is continuing pressure for the Department of Defense (DoD) to cut 
costs and contribute to reducing the national debt. The fiscal year (FY) 2012 
President’s Budget requests $670.9 billion for the DoD, including $553.1 billion in 
base funds and $117.8 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds. 
This is a decrease of $37.3 billion from FY 2011 and will require further scrutiny 
and management of program acquisitions to ensure that only the best programs 
are funded (DoD, 2011).  
Life cycle costs are one of the most important measures in determining 
whether or not to pursue new technologies. CUAS falls into this new technologies 
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Whereas the introduction of CUAS technology will not completely replace all 
current cargo capabilities, it may serve as a supplement or as a viable 
complement to existing capabilities, which has the potential to save lives and 
money. 
1.  High Cost of Current Cargo Replenishment in OEF 
Cargo replenishment of forward operating bases (FOBs) is dependent on 
the number of Marines stationed at those FOBs, how far away those FOBs are, 
and the level of threat expected en route to those FOBs. All supply materials will 
be sent from the main operating base (MOB) and replenish the FOBs in a hub-
and-spoke supply chain. Each of these variables alone plays a major role in the 
cost of replenishment operations.  
All cargo systems use fossil fuel, but the use of manpower differs greatly 
between rotary and ground convoys. For instance, if ground convoys require 
three HMMWV, three MTVR, and 18 Marines in a medium-security convoy, in a 
high-security convoy eight HMMWVs, four MTVRs, and 36 Marines are needed. 
If CUAS can replace some of these armored vehicles, then cost savings might 
well occur.  
C. Logistics 
As is the case with any major war, operational needs drive all facets of 
support. Logistics and an efficient supply chain are major combat enablers in 
OEF. Simply stated, the only way to render proper support to forward locations is 
to have a supply chain that is constantly evolving in response to changing 
conditions and changing threats.  
D. Logistical Delivery Methods  
Several cargo delivery capabilities currently exist at mobile operating 
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 ground convoy transport, including HMMWVs and MTVRs;  
 aerial sling delivery with CH-53E;  
 fixed-wing aircraft using JPADS, which is a guided parachute 
delivery system that uses a Global Positioning System (GPS) to 
distribute supplies accurately; and 
All of these capabilities can be combined to resupply forward operating units. 
Finally, in this study we investigate the best role for CUAS technology as a 
means of replenishment.  
E. Scenario Development  
A study has been developed by the Mission Area Analysis Branch, 
Operations Analysis Division (OAD), Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) as part of a study on CUAS capabilities. We used this study 
as our baseline for analysis because it presents a realistic situation and it has 
been endorsed by PMA-266 for our BCA. We describe this study in detail in 
Chapter II. In this study, we investigate what operational conditions would be 
conducive to effective use of CUAS systems.  
In our analysis, we follow the logic displayed in Figure 1. We analyze the 
distance between the FOB and the MOB, the number of personnel and vehicles 
required to support the FOB, the total resupply in pounds, the platform providing 
support, and the threat level to provide support. 
Figure 1 shows the distances from MOB to FOB, the total resupply in 








Figure 1. OEF Battalion Scenario  
(T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011) 
F. MBA Project Scope and Organization 
Our primary purpose in this project is to analyze the cost and capability of 
CUAS as it is used with all of the other previously discussed cargo capabilities. 
Our analysis indicates if and where CUAS can benefit replenishment operations 
employed in conjunction with existing ground and aerial delivery methods. 
Furthermore, in this project we discuss how the development of CUAS 
technologies can impact and likely benefit the Marines serving in austere 
conditions in Afghanistan. 
This project is organized into five chapters: Chapter I—Introduction, 
Chapter II—Background, Chapter III—Methodology, Chapter IV—Data Analysis, 
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A. Concept of Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom  
The vast and rugged terrain in Afghanistan poses significant challenges to 
standard logistics resupply missions. On the ground, Afghanistan’s road 
networks restrict vehicle movement to narrow passages. Accordingly, vehicle 
convoys within the area of operation (AO) predominantly utilize foot patrols and 
helicopter assaults to escort the vehicle convoys (Merkle, 2010, p. 2).  
The fluid operating environment, harsh climate, and tough terrain create 
the significant problem of how to properly supply dispersed forces. Marines who 
are constantly moving throughout the AO create a logistical challenge. Because 
Marine forces need to be light and agile in Afghanistan, they no longer maintain 
large stockpiles of supplies in support of combat operations (Merkle, 2010, p. 5).  
To overcome these challenges, the Marine Corps has instituted the 
concept of distributed operations (DO). DO can be defined as “deliberate use of 
separation and coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by 
increased access to functional support, as well as by enhanced combat 
capabilities at the small-unit level” (Conway, 2005, p. 1). By delegating tactical 
decision-making to the dispersed platoon level, there has been an increase in the 
capacity for coordinated action within the AO (Merkle, 2010, p. 2). This 
employment means that smaller units have been empowered to move freely 
within the battle space while working in concert with the commander’s intent.  
As the war in Afghanistan has worn on, enhanced company operations 
(ECO) have been developed. ECO can be defined as “an approach to the 
operational art that maximizes the tactical flexibility offered by true decentralized 
mission accomplishment, consistent with commander’s intent and facilitated by 
improved command and control, intelligence, logistics and fires capabilities” 
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independent unit operations (Merkle, 2010, p. 11). ECO seeks to reduce the level 
of sustained independent operations to the company level (Conway, 2008, p. 1). 
The increased level of independent operations at the company level is 
accomplished by adding new enlisted Marines with specific Military Operational 
Specialties (MOSs) in logistics, administration, and communications to the 
Marine infantry company (Merkle, 2010, p. 11). This increase in capability at the 
company level allows greater freedom of movement in a larger AO. ECO places 
the responsibility of command on the company-level leadership and decision-
making is delegated to the lowest level. Like DO, the key tenets for ECO are 
rapid decision-making and the ability for units to move quickly and freely 
throughout the AO.  
In support of DO and ECO, several methods have enhanced the resupply 
of Marines at forward locations in Afghanistan. For this project, we analyzed the 
effectiveness of all methods but took a close look at the CUAS method for 
resupply. We investigate the capability of CUAS to provide the logistical reach to 
effectively support dispersed and independent company and platoon-size 
elements (Merkle, 2010, p. 2).  
B. Requirements for CUAS Capability in Support of OEF 
Current United States Marine Corps (USMC) units deployed to 
Afghanistan in support of OEF require an organic, precision resupply capability to 
minimize loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies on ground resupply 
missions. There is an additional requirement to provide an alternate means of 
aerial delivery when weather, terrain, or enemies pose an unsuitable risk to 
conventional rotary wing assets (E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 
12, 2011). One potential method for implementing improvements in the resupply 
mission is through the employment of CUAS.  
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 background on the CUAS approach, along with specific discussion 
on the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for this new technology;  
 implications and costs of the UAS development process, 
specifically the requirements for the UAS capability, specifications 
for the two companies that have received contract awards for 
prototype airframes, and the resident contract structure and 
program schedule; and  
 considerations and factors facing Navy leadership with regard to 
the future employment and application of the UAS technology. 
At present, a UAS capability is desired to augment existing ground and air 
logistics operations and supplement current rotary wing assets. In addition to 
supplementing traditional methods of resupply, UAS will reduce Marine exposure 
to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as reduce potential delays in 
resupply missions caused by weather, fuel availability, equipment maintenance, 
and flight crew rest.  
IEDs have been specifically responsible for claiming the lives of hundreds 
of Marines tasked with providing security for traditional ground convoys en route 
to replenishing FOBs with basic classes of supply. Figure 2 provides a graphical 
display of projected CONOPS for CUAS employment. As depicted in Figure 2, 
the UAS will utilize a hub-and-spoke method for resupply. In other words, the 
UAS will have an established hub that will be co-located with major logistical 
distribution centers in theater and will use this hub to load and deliver to the 
spokes from which the Marines will be operating at FOBs, combat outposts 








Figure 2. UAS CONOPS 
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
CUAS development started in FY 2009 and will continue through FY 2011, 
to include follow-on deployments in support of OEF. The Navy conducted a 
Quick Reaction Assessment (QRA) in the summer of 2011 to decide which 
contractor’s in-country service option would be exercised. Armed with this 
information, the Marine Corps plans to deploy the CUAS capability in support of 
OEF in the fall of 2011 (Robson, 2010).  
Depending on the results of the QRA, the Marines will be testing the 
capabilities of the Boeing A160T Hummingbird or the Lockheed Martin K-MAX 
helicopters in an operational environment. Upon completion of initial deployment, 
Navy and Marine Corps leadership will determine the value of this capability and 
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3 identifies items that will be tracked or watched by Navy leadership. As depicted 
in Figure 3, some of the key cargo performance measures that Navy leadership 
will monitor are 
 the ability to deliver a minimum of 6,000 pounds of cargo in a 24-
hour window and 
 the ability of the CUAS capability to complement ground convoys 
by reducing the number of trucks on the road by two, thus taking six 
Marines off of the road each day, which leads to the reduction of 
overall risk to human life (E. N. Pratson, personal communication, 
June 12, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 3. Cargo Tracking and Watch Items  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
The possible employment of the CUAS will address the Marine Corps 
need as described in the Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS). 
The CUAS program is an initiative being developed by the Naval Air Systems 
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depiction of a CUAS organizational chart. As displayed in Figure 4, Captain Tim 
Dunigan is the CUAS program manager and he has a traditional supporting staff, 
including experts in acquisition, cost estimating, contracting, testing and 
evaluation, engineering, and logistics. It is apparent by looking at this figure that 
the Marine Corps have taken a keen interest in CUAS by investing many 
resources to develop and monitor the progress of this program. 
 
 
Figure 4. CUAS Organizational Chart  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
 
The CUAS demonstration project is a government-owned and contractor-
operated program. It will be managed by organic unmanned aerial vehicle 
squadron (VMU) detachments to support U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Battalions 
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011). In December 2010, the 
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Martin for CUAS technology. Both contracts include the development of two 
aircraft systems, three remote ground control stations, and a QRA. Each contract 
includes a fixed-price option for a six-month deployment to OEF (Mortimer, 
2010).  
Figures 5–7 provide amplifying information on the acquisition background, 
program schedule, recent accomplishments, and test and training periods. As 
displayed, the Marine Corps original statement of need for this program was 
issued in October 2008, PMA-266 was assigned to the acquisition effort in 
January 2009, and the deployment of a CUAS capability is scheduled for October 
2011. In addition, as depicted, the contracts issued have used full and open 
competition and both Lockheed Martin and Boeing have been advised that they 
must successfully pass the QRA scheduled for August 2011. Depending on the 
results, one company will deploy its two CUASs in support of the Marines in 
OEF.  
 
Figure 5. Acquisition Background  








Figure 6. Program Schedule  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
 
Figure 7. Acquisition Schedule  
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One or more deployments (depending on feedback from the Marine 
leadership in Afghanistan) will be funded by Research Development Testing and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) for the air vehicles, hardware, deployment preparation, and 
operational assessment. The deployed services will be funded by Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M). The total cost is estimated for a six-month period of service. 
This period is due to the fact that this program will be a performance-based 
service. The total cost of the air vehicles is included in the contract price (E. N. 
Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011). 
Figures 8 and 9 contain the following NAVAIR CUAS cost estimates and 
budget information:  
 the total cost for RDT&E for both contracts is approximately $51 
million, and the O&M cost is close to $61 million (E. N. Pratson, 
personal communication, June 12, 2011); and 
 the UAS total budget for FY 2011 is $68 million, $54 million in 2012, 
and $105 million in 2013 (E. N. Pratson, personal communication, 
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Total FY11 OCO 
O&MN,MC 
Air Vehicles Cost 2 24,200,000 48,400,000    
Air Vehicles Quantity 2     
Nonrecurring Kr Manpower   2 6,875,000 13,750,000 
Other Nonrecurring Costs   2 4,840,000 9,680,000 
In-Theater Services    23,386,880 23,386,880 
Total Contractor 
Costs 
 24,200,000 48,400,000  35,101,880 46,816,880 
       
Gov’t Expenses       
Test & Evaluation 2 900,000 1,800,000    
OEF Taxes     1,500,000 1,500,000 
NAVAIR Team  300,000 300,000 2 2,900,000 5,800,000 
Risk/MR Set-aside  1,000,000 1,000,000 2 3,400,000 6,800,000 
Total Gov’t Expenses  2,200,000 3,100,000  7,800,000 14,100,000 
       
Total Project Cost  $   26,400,000 $   51,500,000  $   
42,901,880 
$   60,916,880 
Figure 8. Immediate CUAS Deployment Cost Estimate  








Figure 9. CUAS Budget  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
The program will be considered a Pre-Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
Technology Project for demonstration and initial fielding of the system under one 
or more services contracts. Following the testing and field evaluation, the 
requirement to continue to support the project in an operational environment may 
transition the program into the equivalent of an ACAT program. This evaluation 
would ultimately lead to the development of an appropriate strategy to enter the 
formal acquisition cycle (E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011). 
The CUAS capability can make significant contributions to the following 
related operational objectives:  
 enhance rotary-wing and tilt rotor assault support transport (AST) 
capabilities; 
 reduce risks to the rotary-wing and tilt rotor force, providing an 
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 remove a significant number of vehicles from exposure to enemy 
threats, such as IEDs.  
The desired hardware manifestation of the UAS program is a platform that 
is capable of carrying 6,000 pounds of cargo delivered over a round-trip distance 
of 150 nautical miles within a 24-hour period, with a minimum lift of 2,500 pounds 
in six hours.  
Other requirements include the ability to hover at 12,000–15,000 feet and 
fly at 18,000–20,000 feet with a full cargo load (E. N. Pratson, personal 
communication, June 12, 2011). 
The Marines’ key interest in the program is the ability to have a system 
that can operate autonomously beyond line of sight with GPS en route waypoint 
navigation and that can be controlled remotely at designated cargo delivery 
locations. It is anticipated by our research that the CUAS will provide affordable, 
reliable, effective, and safe resupply missions. Figure 10 provides the capabilities 
of the Lockheed Martin K-MAX and the Boeing A 160T Hummingbird aircraft 
variants.  
As depicted in Figure 10, both the K-MAX and the A160T have 
successfully demonstrated the ability to accomplish the following: deliver 2,500 
pounds of cargo in a six-hour period to a location 75 nautical miles away, hover 
with 750-pound loads at 12,000 feet, operate beyond line of sight with GPS en 
route navigation, deliver cargo with the accuracy of 10 meters with terminal 
controller, terminal control capability to shift location 1,000 meters, and maintain 








Figure 10. UAS Demonstrated Capabilities 
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
The K-MAX’s unique features include a multiple drop capability of four 
750-pound loads simultaneously and a lift capability of over 3,000 pounds. The 
A160T’s unique features include a ground control station that weighs less than 
20 pounds and that has a terminal delivery accuracy of less than three meters (E. 
N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011). 
Figures 11–13 provide additional specifics about individual company 








Figure 11. Lockheed Martin System View  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
 
Figure 12. A160T Block II Configuration 








Figure 13. Boeing System View  
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) 
Upon the completion of all evaluation and field testing, the Navy and 
Marine leadership’s next objective is to determine the best logistical resupply 
procedures for supporting the Marines at forward locations in Afghanistan. Senior 
Marine and Navy leadership must make five preliminary decisions: (1) determine 
if the CUAS capability is a good idea for logistical operations in Afghanistan; (2) 
determine if UAS integration and employment fits with the current Marine 
operational strategy in OEF; (3) determine the Marine Corps’ capacity to employ 
UAS working in concert with established doctrine; (4) determine if it makes sense 
from a resource perspective in the form of timeliness of support, supply mission 
reliability, and level of casualty risks encountered; and (5) determine if UAS 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
C. Prior Analysis of CUAS Capability 
There have been several in-depth studies previously completed on the 
topic of CUAS. In this project, we extensively use one study conducted by the 
Marines and one study conducted by the U.S. Army. The Marine study was 
completed by the Operations Analysis Division (OAD), Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC), in 2010. The Army study was completed by 
the U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency in 2011. 
The Marine study looked at how the capabilities of CUAS compared to 
current ground vehicle and assault support aircraft capabilities. The researchers 
designed the study to evaluate under what conditions employment of unmanned 
aerial cargo delivery systems would enhance operational capabilities. They also 
looked at the metrics and data required for inclusion in an operational setting. 
This study was heavily dependent upon risk analysis. As previously discussed, 
the current cargo carriers include the Armored MTVR, CH-53E, and KC-130J. 
CUAS carriers include the K-MAX and the A160T. JPADS cargo carrier includes 
the Ultra Light (S. R. Parker, personal communication, August 1, 2011). 
By way of methodology, the Marine study used data and assumptions 
from an OEF battalion scenario and an analysis presented to Commanding 
General, MCCDC in December 2008. Figure 14 provides a graphical depiction of 
the scenario. As noted previously, we used this scenario as a baseline for our 
analysis in our project.  The scope of the previous Marine study was to 
investigate resupply support to five FOBs. The researchers in this study 
specifically looked at the locations of FOBs, the number of personnel at each 
FOB, the number of vehicles required to resupply each FOB, the total resupply 
requirement in pounds, the elevation at the FOB, the current logistics concept of 








Figure 14. OEF Battalion Scenario  
(T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011) 
One important baseline assumption for the Marine study was that resupply 
would be conducted every three days or three days of supply (DOS). Some 
additional considerations included supply consumption, supply storage, vehicle 
capabilities, vehicle manning, vehicle availability, vehicle cargo lift capacity, and 
operating altitude constraints (T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 
2011). 
The Marine study developed several important quantifiable measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) for resupply missions. These MOEs included 
 the number of sorties to deliver supplies (three DOS), 
 the time to accomplish resupply measured in days, 
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 the supplies delivered per fuel consumed measured in pounds per 
gallon, 
 the mission man-hours measured per 1,000 pounds of supply, 
 the cargo throughput capacity measured in tons per day, and  
 the throughput utilization measured in percentage of cargo 
throughput capacity (T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 
2011). 
Key conclusions from the study included the following findings:  
 CH-53E or KC-130J options have the current capacity to deliver 
100% of required supplies; 
 increasing UAS operating hours is critical to obtaining a decisive 
advantage as it pertains to cargo effectiveness;  
 measures other than fuel consumption need to be considered when 
determining the delivery efficiency of a particular resupply method;  
 the amount of security and support for ground convoys has a 
significant effect on results because it accounts for 46% of fuel 
consumed in a medium-security convoy and 60% of fuel consumed 
in a high-security convoy;  
 all UAS platforms achieved fuel economy over convoy; and  
 cargo capacity, speed, fuel consumption, vehicle availability, and 
number in crew are all factors that need to be considered when 
evaluating the delivery effectiveness of any resupply method (T. J. 
Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011). 
Now that we have looked at the Marine Corps study, we will transition to 
the Army study. The main goal for this study was to find an affordable resupply 
alternative that would reduce the risk to soldiers performing resupply operations 
through traditional means. The Army researchers conducted their analysis using 
a detailed cost benefit analysis (CBA). The scope of their study was to provide 
resupply support to seven combat outposts (COPs). Decision criteria for the 
study included personnel costs, operations costs, maintenance costs, fuel 
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including status quo, 100% CUAS, 60% CUAS, 30% CUAS, and all Army 
assets—air and ground (U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency, 2011).  
Key assumptions for the study included the following:  
 further research and development (R&D) for UAS will not be 
required; 
 no acquisition cost will be associated with UAS, only replacement 
cost; 
 no critical or emergency requirements will be used for analysis, only 
routine resupply; 
 manned assets (ground and air) will be available when required; 
and  
 required ground handling equipment and ramp space will be 
available for staging supplies (U.S. Army Logistics Innovation 
Agency, 2011). 
There were several important CBA cost methods for the various methods 
of resupply including ground convoy, CH-47, UAS, United States Air Force 
(USAF) assets, contract air, and contract ground. Ground convoy cost = fuel + 
manpower + maintenance + attrition + casualty. CH-47 cost includes mission 
hour cost + personnel cost + attrition + casualty. UAS cost = mission hour cost + 
personnel cost + attrition. Fixed wing cost = mission hours per week * O&M cost 
per hour. Contract air cost = mission hour per week * contractor cost. Contract 
ground cost = number of days per mission per week * contractor daily cost (U.S. 
Army Logistics Innovation Agency, 2011). 
The Army CBA reached a few important conclusions, including that CUAS 
capability is fiscally viable, reduces the number of soldiers required, takes trucks 
off the road, and keeps soldiers out of harm’s way (U.S. Army Logistics 
Innovation Agency, 2011). Based on the analysis performed, the Army study 
concluded that a CUAS is affordable when compared with the other courses of 
action. Additionally, the study discovered that the Army can expedite the flow of 
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trucks that would have to handle the same amount of cargo through various 
nodes (MOBs, FOBs, COPs). Due to the emerging and incremental nature of 
CUAS technology, this study does not recommend immediate acquisition and 
operation of CUAS into the Army resupply inventory. The Army study 
recommends a short-, mid-, and long-term approach to using and making CUAS 
capability a reality. Figure 15 provides a summary of the Army’s CBA. 
 
Figure 15. COA Analysis and Cost Benefit Summary  
(U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency, 2011) 
D. Business Case Analysis 
A BCA is a tool used by managers to assess (inter alia) how a new 
technology compares to an existing technology that performs the same function. 
The goal of a BCA is to help management decide whether to invest in the new 
technology and if that new technology will bring sufficient additional value to the 
table to justify its costs. The BCA provides a justification for proceeding with a 
given project. A BCA is best presented in a well-structured, written document and 
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the options considered, the expected costs of the project, the impact to 
stakeholders, and the expected risks (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 
2011). A BCA typically determines the following: 
 the relative cost versus benefits of different support strategies, 
 the methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs, 
 the impact and value of performance/cost/schedule/sustainment 
tradeoffs, 
 the data required to support and justify a performance-based 
logistics strategy, 
 the sensitivity of the data to change, 
 the analysis and classification of risks, and 
 a recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for 
proceeding with the best value alternative (DAU, 2011). 
BCAs typically continue throughout the life cycle process of the project 
and are updated as necessary to reevaluate the project because life cycle costs 
and other improvements may change. Due to this notion, there are no two BCAs 
that are exactly the same and they are formatted and customized to each specific 
project. As illustrated in Figure 16, the four steps of a BCA are definition, data 








Figure 16. Steps in BCA Process  
(DAU, 2011) 
1. Definition 
In the definition stage of the BCA, managers describe the scope of the 
analysis and set assumptions, constraints, and scenarios that will direct the 
analysis. During this stage, the managers identify the groundwork for the BCA 
and communicate to decision-makers the reasons why the analysis is needed. All 
alternatives identified are considered and compared to the status quo (DAU, 
2011). 
2. Data Collection 
In the data collection stage, managers identify the types of data that will 
be necessary to complete the analysis and classify that data into categories. 
They identify data sources and all relevant data, including cost data, as well as 
performance data. Managers estimate any data that is not available and describe 
the approach to that estimation. They normalize all data and scrutinize for 
accuracy. Data normalization ensures that “apples are being compared to 
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3. Evaluation Analysis   
In the evaluation analysis, managers use the data collected in the second 
stage of the BCA and begin the applicable calculations using both quantitative 
and qualitative data. They compare each scenario against the other to determine 
which alternative has the lowest cost and the best performance. Managers then 
identify an optimal combination of low cost and high performance to find the best 
value alternative. They also conduct a risk and sensitivity analysis, identify 
potential risks, and determine ways of mitigating those risks. Sensitivity analysis 
determines the effect that changes in particular inputs and constraints will have 
on the analysis (for example, changes in fuel costs or lower costs of the new 
alternative may change the solution; DAU, 2011).  
4. Results Presentation 
The results presentation is the final stage and is where managers 
communicate the results of the analysis to the decision-makers. Managers 
construct their conclusions around the objectives of the analysis that they stated 
earlier in the case. They use charts and graphs to communicate the results of all 
quantitative data along with a narrative description to ensure that the results are 
easily interpreted. They also discuss any unexpected results, outliers, or easily 
misinterpreted results. Finally, they identify a recommended course of action and 
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III. CUAS Business Case Analysis Methodology 
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the benefits of the CUAS to the 
existing delivery methods for cargo resupply missions in Afghanistan. As 
discussed in the background chapter, we analyzed two CUAS helicopter 
systems: Boeing’s A160T Hummingbird and Lockheed Martin’s K-MAX. For the 
status quo, we analyzed four methods for resupply: medium-security ground 
convoy, high-security ground convoy, CH-53E, and KC-130J with JPADs. 
In this chapter, we describe the five representative scenarios used to 
assess CUAS as a method of resupply. Using the BCA we compare the costs of 
these platforms performing various logistical resupply missions. We explain the 
composition of required personnel and assets for each method of resupply in 
Section A. We explain the individual characteristics and capabilities for each 
method of resupply in Section B, the scenarios in Section C, the known cost 
drivers in Section D, and the models used in the analysis in Section E.  
In Chapter IV, we present the analysis of the available data. In Section A 
of Chapter IV, we present a linear programming transportation model that takes 
account of routine resupply missions and risk exposure. This is followed by a 
computation of baseline and alternative solutions for resupply optimization in 
Sections B and C. Section D is comprised of the internal rate of return. In Section 
E, we describe sensitivity analysis with respect to the cost of human life. In 
Section F, we illustrate risk analysis.  
A. Composition of Required Personnel and Assets for 
Methods of Resupply 
For planning purposes, medium-security ground convoys require 18 
personnel, including three armored HMMWVs and three armored MTVRs. The 
number of personnel is calculated based on each vehicle having a driver, a 
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personnel, including eight armored HMMWVs and four armored MTVRs. CH-
53Es require four personnel, including two pilots and two aircrew members. KC-
130Js with JPADS require four personnel, including two pilots, a flight engineer, 
and a loadmaster. Both variants of CUAS require zero pilots but they do require 
eight Marines, including one contracting officer representative (COR), two 
mission commanders (naval aviators or air traffic controllers), and five unmanned 
aerial vehicle squadron (VMU) enlisted air vehicle operators. There will be a 
ground control station (GCS) located at the MOB, as well as a GCS located at 
each of the FOBs (T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011). 
B. Characteristics of Assets for Resupply 
In our scenarios, only MTVRs were used to carry cargo in the medium- 
and high-security ground convoys. HMMWVs were used as maneuver and 
security vehicles. Characteristics of an armored MTVR include a payload with 
trailer of 21,400 pounds, a fuel consumption rate of 13.3 gallons per hour, an 
average speed in scenario of 9.7 miles per hour, and 12 hours of operational use 
per day. Thus, a medium-security ground convoy has a maximum payload of 
64,200 pounds with a fuel consumption rate of 57.9 gallons per hour and a high-
security ground convoy has a maximum payload of 85,600 pounds with a fuel 
consumption rate of 102.2 gallons per hour (T. J. Merkle, personal 
communication, June 9, 2011). 
Characteristics of a CH-53E include a maximum payload with sling of 
17,125 pounds, fuel consumption with external load of 573.5 gallons per hour, a 
maximum altitude of 18,480 feet, and a cruising speed of 120 knots (T. J. Merkle, 
personal communication, June 9, 2011). 
For our analysis, we looked at the employment of precision-guided air 
delivery through the employment of JPADS from the KC-130J platform. 
Characteristics of a KC-130J include a maximum payload of 35,000 pounds, fuel 
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cruising speed of 240 knots, and a maximum of five JPAD systems.  JPADS 
characteristics include an ultra light weight (ULW) variant payload of 250–700 
pounds (S. R. Parker, personal communication, August 1, 2011). 
K-MAX characteristics include a maximum payload of 4,915 pounds, a 
maximum altitude of 15,000 feet, egress cruising speed (no sling) of 100 knots, 
ingress cruising speed (sling) of 80 knots, a fuel consumption rate for egress of 
73.5 gallons per hour, and a fuel consumption rate for ingress of 102.9 gallons 
per hour (T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011). 
A160T characteristics include a maximum payload of 1,250 pounds, a 
maximum altitude of 20,000 feet, egress cruising speed (no sling) of 94.9 knots, 
ingress cruising speed (sling) of 56.7 knots, a fuel consumption rate for egress of 
21.1 gallons per hour, and a fuel consumption rate for ingress of 22.4 gallons per 
hour (T. J. Merkle, personal communication, June 9, 2011). 
C. Operational Scenarios 
The operational scenario we created for this analysis is based on a 
strategic employment plan to provide responsive logistics to Marines operating in 
austere forward deployed detachments. Specifically, the scenario depicts an 
infantry battalion operating in Afghanistan with five FOBs. These five FOBs are 
operationally realistic and were chosen by MCCDC to represent the variance in 
number of forces, total resupply requirements, and distances to the FOBs from 
the MOB. The period between resupply missions is three days. The requirement 
of pounds per Marine varies based on the mission being conducted at each 
respective FOB. For instance, an FOB that possesses a weapons company will 
require more pounds per resupply mission compared to a rifle company. These 
scenarios are used in our analysis to estimate the life cycle costs of the resupply 
methods. The following five FOBs were used to develop the tasking requirements 
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 FOB A is located 48.3 miles from the MOB and the total resupply 
required is 54,619 pounds for 130 Marines, 
 FOB B is located 78.3 miles from the MOB and the total resupply 
required is 45,036 pounds for 86 Marines, 
 FOB C is located 71.3 miles from the MOB and the total resupply 
required is 72,971 pounds for 96 Marines, 
 FOB D is located 41.4 miles from the MOB and the total resupply 
required is 168,878 pounds for 230 Marines, and 
 FOB E is located 48.3 miles from the MOB and the total resupply 
required is 44,691 pounds for 85 Marines (T. J. Merkle, personal 
communication, June 9, 2011). 
1.  CUAS Operating Base (MOB) 
For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that both CUAS and status 
quo methods of resupply missions may be launched from Camp Bastion, where 
the MOB is located. 
2. Time Calculations for Resupply Missions by Platform 
Time required per resupply mission was given for ground convoys, as well 
as fixed and rotary wing. For each ground convoy, we used the miles from the 
MOB to the FOB to drive our cost analysis. For each air platform, we first 
converted its cruising speed with payload from knots to miles per hour, then 
found the correct cruising speed, and finally multiplied by the number of miles 
traveled. For example, the following calculations are for a CH-53E for FOB A 
resupply:  
 CH-53E cruising speed with payload converted to miles per hour 
(120 knots * 1.150 = 138.1 miles/hour), and 
 cruising speed (138.1 miles/hour) multiplied by the number of miles 
to FOB A (48.3 miles) = 0.35 hours. 
Table 1 provides a summary of distances and times required to conduct 
resupply missions to various FOBs. 
 







Security Hours CH‐53E Hours KC‐130J Hours A160T Hours K‐MAX
FOB A 96.6 12 6 0.70 0.65 1.11 0.93
FOB B 156.6 12 6 1.13 1.05 1.80 1.51
FOB C 142.6 12 6 1.03 0.95 1.64 1.38
FOB D 82.8 12 6 0.60 0.55 0.95 0.80
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D. Known Cost Drivers 
1. Platform Procurement/Replacement Costs 
Due to the nature of military employment, we know that there will be a rate 
of attrition, which means replacing assets that are destroyed through enemy 
engagements or other mishaps. We estimated the replacement costs for each 
resupply platform. These costs are described in more detail in our discussion 
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2. Platform Operating and Support Costs 
We estimated operating and support costs for each resupply platform 
using dollars per mile for ground convoys and dollars per flight hour for air 
platforms. The calculations for ground convoy costs include fuel/mile + 
manpower/mile + maintenance/mile + personnel risk exposure/mile + platform 
risk exposure/mile. The calculations for CH-53E are fuel/hour + manpower/hour + 
maintenance/hour + personnel risk exposure/hour + platform risk exposure/hour. 
The calculations for KC-130J are fuel/hour + manpower/hour + maintenance/hour 
+ personnel risk exposure/hour + platform (KC-130J) risk exposure/hour + 
platform (JPADS) risk exposure/hour. The calculations for JPADS costs include 
0.05 * $12,000 (replacement costs). This cost is based on the assumption that 
95% of the JPADS will be recovered (GPS and associated sensitive equipment) 
for each evolution, whereas the canopy will not always be recovered in a 
reusable manner. The calculations for both variants of CUAS costs included 
fuel/hour + maintenance/hour + GCS manpower/hour + risk exposure 
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3. Personnel Risk Exposure 
In order to incorporate risk exposure into our BCA, we made an 
assumption that the cost of life for each Marine killed is $6 million. This figure is 
based on life insurance, survivor benefits, loss of earnings, lost human capital, 
and welfare lost to society. The DoD does not publically place a value on human 
life. However, other U.S. government agencies do place a value on human life. 
For example, the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation 
Administration use $3 million, the Environmental Protection Agency uses $6.1 
million, the Food and Drug Administration uses $6.5 million, and the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission uses $5 million (Silny, Little, & Remer, 2010). All of 
these values are based on year 2006 U.S. dollars and were used as a reference 
for our $6 million value.  
In order to properly account for the loss of a Marine killed, we used the 
following calculation: rate of loss of personnel due to enemy or mishap * number 
of personnel exposed to risk per platform * $6,000,000. The loss rate of ground 
personnel was determined by using the 2008 joint IED defense office study, 
which stated that on average 
 ground convoys are attacked every 808 miles and there would be 
one killed in action (KIA) out of every 16 attacks; 
 assumption of a one-year deployment resulted in 122 ground 
convoys (365/3=122); 
 122 convoys multiplied by the total miles traveled for one complete 
replenishment of all five FOBs equaled 575.2 miles; 
 122 convoys * 575.2 miles resulted in 70,175 total miles per year; 
 total miles per year divided by miles per attack resulted in 87 
attacks (70175/808 = 87 attacks); 
 87 total attacks per year divided by every 16 attacks resulted in one 
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 total miles traveled divided by attacks resulted in a KIA rate of 
0.0000774 (5.43/70,175 = 0.0000774); and 
 attack rate multiplied by the $6,000,000 cost of human life, resulted 
in a $1,393.20 per mile per truck cost. (General Dynamics, 2010)  
The loss rates for fixed and rotary wing aircraft were calculated from 
statistics taken from the Naval Safety Center (2011). They were calculated by the 
number of Class A (property damage over $2 million and/or fatality or permanent 
disability) mishaps divided by the total flight hours per platform. Once these 
calculations were completed, we added the associated costs to the operating 
costs for each ground and air platform. Table 4 provides a summary of these 
personnel risk exposure costs. 
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4. Platform Risk Exposure  
We also investigated losses that were associated with each method of 
resupply as follows: rate of loss of resupply platform due to enemy or mishap * 
replacement costs for platforms. The loss rate of ground personnel was 
determined by using the 2008 joint IED defense office JIEDDO as stated in the 
General Dynamics AR-5 study, 2010. This study stated that 
 on average, ground convoys are attacked every 808 miles; 
 one ground convoy prevented from completing its resupply mission 
for every 11 attacks; 
 assumption of a one-year deployment resulting in 122 ground 
convoys (365/3 = 122) multiplied by the total miles traveled for one 
total replenishment of all five FOBs equaling 575.2 miles resulting 
in 70,175 total miles per year; 
 total miles per year divided by miles per attack (70175/808 = 87 
attacks) resulted in 87 attacks; 
 87 total attacks per year divided by every 11 attacks resulting in 
one resupply mission being prevented (87/11 = 7.91) resulted in a 
rate of 7.91 attacks; 
 rate of attacks resulting in resupply missions being prevented was 
then divided by total miles (7.91/70,175 = 0.000113) resulting in a 
rate of 0.000113; 
 attack rate is then multiplied by the procurement cost of ground 
vehicles and provides a per mile cost for each ground platform; 
 loss rates for manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft were taken from 
the Naval Safety Center and are the same calculation as previously 
stated for the risk exposure of personnel; and 
 unmanned loss rates were taken from the average loss rates of the 
MQ-9 Reaper (Air Force Safety Center, 2008). They were 
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=
Once these calculations were completed we added the associated costs 
to the operating costs for each platform. Table 5 provides a summary of these 
platform risk exposure costs.  
 
 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 40 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
E. Model Development  
In order to conduct our analysis, we used a linear programming transportation 
model. The objective function minimizes cost during resupply missions, while the 
constraints are total pounds required for each FOB, time required for resupply, 
platform payload capacities, and operating and support costs. Our analysis looked at 
both routine resupply missions and risk exposure. The next section is a detailed 
description of the optimization model.  
1. Routine Resupply Mission Model 
Decision Variables: 
ijkX  the number of deliveries transported from MOB i to FOB j via platform k.  
where: 
i = MOB (M) 
j = FOB (A, B, C, D, E) 
k = GMS (ground medium security), GHS (ground high security), CH (CH-53E), C 
(KC- 130J), HUM (A160T Hummingbird), MAX (K-MAX) 
Objective Function:  
Minimize total transportation costs =  
64290XMAGMS+ 85600XMAGHS + 17125XMACH + 35000XMAC + 1250XMAHUM + 
4915XMAMAX + 64290XMBGMS + 85600XMBGHS + 17125XMBCH + 35000XMBC + 
1250XMBHUM + 4915XMBMAX + 64290XMCGMS + 85600XMCGHS + 17125XMCCH + 
35000XMCC + 1250XMCHUM + 49151XMCMAX + 64290XMCGMS + 85600MCGHS + 
17125MDCH + 35000MDC + 1250XMCHUM + 4915XMDMAX + 64290XMEGMS + 
85600XMEGHS + 17125XMECH + 35000XMEC + 1250XMEHUM + 4915XMEMAX 
Subject to constraints:  
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XMBGMS + XMBGHS + XMBCH + XMBC + XMBHUM + XMBMAX  > 45,036 pounds (FOB 
B Demand) 
XMCGMS + XMCGHS + XMCCH + XMCC + XMCHUM + XMCMAX  > 72,971 pounds (FOB 
C Demand) 
XMDGMS + XMDGHS + XMDCH + XMDC + XMDHUM + XMDMAX  > 166,878 pounds 
(FOB D Demand) 
XMEGMS + XMEGHS + XMECH + XMEC + XMEHUM + XMEMAX  > 44,619 pounds (FOB 
E Demand) 
Xmagms + Xmaghs + Xmach + Xmac + Xmahum + Xmamax  > 54,619 + 20% 
pounds (FOB A Demand) 
Xmbgms + Xmbghs + Xmbch + Xmbc + Xmbhum + Xmbmax  > 45,036 + 20% 
pounds (FOB B Demand) 
Xmcgms + Xmcghs + Xmcch + Xmcc + Xmchum + Xmcmax   > 72,971 + 20% 
pounds (FOB C Demand) 
Xmdgms + Xmdghs + Xmdch + Xmdc + Xmdhum + Xmdmax  > 166,878 + 20% 
pounds (FOB D Demand) 
Xmegms + Xmeghs + Xmech + Xmec + Xmehum + Xmemax  > 44,619 + 20% 
pounds (FOB E Demand) 
XMAGMS + XMBGMS + XMCGMS + XMDGMS + XMEGMS < 4 (Sorties/Convoys)  
XMAGHS + XMBGHS + XMCGHS + XMDGHS + XMEGHS < 4 (Sorties/Convoys)  
XMACH + XMBCH + XMCCH + XMDCH + XMECH < 8 (Sorties/Convoys)  
XMAC + XMBC + XMCC + XMDC + XMEC < 2 (Sorties/Convoys)  
XMAHUM + XMBHUM + XMCHUM + XMDHUM + XMEHUM < 8 (Sorties/Convoys) 
XMAMAX + XMBMAX + XMCMAX + XMDMAX + XMEMAX < 8 (Sorties/Convoys) 
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The decision variables for this linear programming model resulted in 30 
potential methods of delivering supplies to the FOBs due to the fact that there are 
five destinations and six platforms capable of completing the resupply missions. 
Decision variables denote the flow of supplies between two nodes in the 
transportation network. For simplicity, the flows of supplies are represented by a 
triple-subscripted decision variable. The first subscript represents the origin of the 
supplies. The second subscript represents the destination of the supplies. The third 
subscript represents the platform that was used to transport the supplies. The 
objective function for this model seeks to minimize the total transportation costs 
associated with the platform or platforms used in that resupply mission. 
The demand constraints represent the total demand of supplies that are 
necessary at each FOB. The convoy/sortie constraints represent the total number of 
convoys or sorties that are available at the time when resupply missions are 
required. The convoy/sortie constraint also takes into account the payload of each 
platform and ensures that the platforms chosen do not exceed their payload capacity 
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IV. Cargo UAS Business Case Analysis Data 
Analysis 
A. Utilization of Crystal Ball’s OptQuest Application for 
Linear Optimization 
We used a linear programming transportation model to conduct our data 
analysis. The objective function was to minimize total transportation cost during 
resupply missions. These missions were constrained by total pounds required for 
each FOB, time required for resupply, platform payload capacities, and operating 
and support costs. Initially, we attempted in our analysis to utilize Excel’s Solver 
Application, but we quickly found that the Solver Application was not able to provide 
feasible solutions. This was in large part due to the complexity of the constraints, 
specifically the requirement for specified pounds per FOB. The main issue that arose 
was that Solver was not maximizing on the utilization of the K-MAX UAS as 
compared to ground convoys. Upon encountering this issue, we transitioned our 
transportation model to Crystal Ball’s OptQuest application due to its more powerful 
optimization capability. Thus, we were able solve the model and obtain feasible 
solutions. 
B. Baseline/Status Quo for Resupply Optimization 
1. Baseline 1 (GMS, CH-53E, AND KC-130J) 
In order to develop the potential benefits of CUAS, we need to establish 
baseline costs by capturing the true costs of only utilizing status quo platforms for 
resupply. We created two baselines: Baseline 1 assumes a moderate security threat 
and uses ground medium security along with CH-53E and KC-130J; Baseline 2 
assumes a high security threat and uses ground high security along with CH-53E 
and KC-130J. Using OptQuest, Baseline 1 was found to have a total minimized 
transportation solution of $1,766,641. A graphical depiction of Baseline 1 is 








Figure 17. Baseline 1  
2. Baseline 2 (GHS, CH-53E, AND KC-130J) 
Baseline 2 assumes a high security threat and uses ground high security 
along with CH-53E and KC-130J. Using OptQuest, Baseline 2 was found to have a 
total minimized transportation solution of $3,141,644. A graphical depiction of 
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Figure 18. Baseline 2 
C. Alternatives for Resupply Optimization  
1. Alternative 1 (GMS, CH-53E, KC-130J, AND K-MAX UAS) 
After we established baselines, we found four alternative solutions utilizing 
both variants of CUAS, both forms of ground convoys, and CH-53E and KC-130J. 
Using OptQuest, Alternative 1, depicted in Figure 19, shows that with the use of K-
MAX CUAS, ground convoys can be completely eliminated with a reduced 
transportation cost of $743,517. This alternative illustrates the fact that an all-air 
method resupply has the potential to be an attractive solution, in large part due to 
the K-MAX’s large payload capacity. A graphical depiction of Alternative 1 is 
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Figure 19. Alternative 1 
2. Alternative 2 (GMS, CH-53E, KC-130J AND A160T UAS) 
Alternative 2, depicted in Figure 20, illustrates the fact that the A160T was 
only used for 4% of the cargo replenishment and has a total transportation cost of 
$2,416,737. Of note, this alternative has a total transportation cost of over three 
times the cost of Alternative 1. It is appartent by analyzing this alternative that the 
A160T CUAS is not an attractive method of resupply because it does not take 
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Figure 20. Alternative 2 
3. Alternative 3 (GHS, CH-53E, KC-130J AND K-MAX UAS) 
Although Alternative 3, depicted in Figure 21, would in theory use ground high 
security convoys, the solution ends the same as Alternative 1, with a total 
transportation cost of $743,517. This alternative illustrates the fact that with the 
utilization of K-MAX CUAS, ground convoys can once again be eliminated from the 
solution. In addition, this alternative illustrates the fact that an all-air method resupply 
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Figure 21. Alternative 3 
4. Alternative 4 (GHS, CH-53E, KC-130J AND A160T UAS) 
Alternative 4, depicted in Figure 22, shows that the A160T was only used for 
4% of the cargo replenishment, which is similar to Alternative 2. The total 
transportation cost was $1,958,985, which was less than Alternative 2 due to the fact 
that in Alternative 4 only one high-security ground convoy was utilized as compared 
to Alternative 2, which utilzed two medium-security ground convoys. As discussed 
previously, this is due to the difference in payload capacity between the two methods 
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Figure 22. Alternative 4 
D. Internal Rate of Return 
In order to calculate the Internal Rate of Return, we utilized a 10-year 
planning horizon. This time frame could be viewed as a mildly unfavorable 
conservative assumption, but we found that the 10-year planning horizon resulted in 
the K-MAX recouping the initial procurement investment in the first six months of 
operations. We calculated the return on this investment by taking the difference 
between Baseline 2 and Alternative 1 and multiplying that difference by 122 annual 
replenishment cycles. In regard to operations and support cost computation, we 
were unable to find accurate data for the K-MAX due to the immaturity level of this 
new technology, so we utilized MQ-9 Reaper operations and support costs to 
approximate.  
E. Sensitivity Analysis 
1. Cost of Human Life 
We based all baseline and alternative solutions on the value of a human life 
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depending on different individuals’ opinions. Due to the subjective nature of the 
value of human life, a sensitivity analysis on this value was conducted. In our 
analysis, we systematically lowered the cost of a human life from $6 million to $0 in 
$500,000 increments. Once we changed the value of a human life, we reran and re-
solved the model and recorded the total transportion cost.  
When analyzing the cost of human life for the K-MAX CUAS, we only utilized 
ground medium security, CH-53E, and KC-130J with JPADS. We did this because 
Alternatives 1 and 3 found that the K-MAX can completely eliminate ground 
convoys, so using either ground medium security or ground high security will not 
have an effect on the solution.  
When analyzing the cost of human life for A160T CUAS we utilized both 
methods of ground convoys, CH-53E, and KC-130J with JPADS, due to the disparity 
in Alternatives 2 and 4 when we used different convoys. A graphical depiction of this 
analysis is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Cost of Human Life Graph 
2. Conclusion 
Based on our sensitivity analysis, we concluded that human life would need to 
be valued below $2 million before ground convoys would be less expensive to use 
than the K-MAX. By not using the K-MAX, more Marines would be exposed to risk, 
which would result in some loss of life based on the statistics found by JIEDDO. 
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ground convoy would need to be used to replace all but four K-MAX sorties. Based 
on JIEDDO, this would result in six Marines being KIA per year (General Dynamic, 
2010). When human life is valued at $0, three ground convoys, seven CH-53E 
sorties, four KC-130J sorties, and four K-MAX sorties would need to be used. Based 
on JIEDDO statistics, this would result in 15 Marines KIA per year (General 
Dynamics, 2010). Of note, JIEDDO statistics are based solely on Iraq ground convoy 
operations. These KIA findings are most likely a low estimate for operations in 
Afghanistan. The end result of these findings is that the K-MAX is a program that the 
DoD should invest in and that should be considered to become a program of record. 
We found that the A160T simply lacks the payload capacity to be a significant 
player in this scenario, and it only increases the total transportation cost quite 
significantly. However, the A160T may have a role in a niche replenishment scenario 
(special operations, immediate resupply needs, etc.). 
F. Risk Analysis 
There are several potential sources of cost, schedule, and performance risk 
for CUAS. These risks relate to technology, threats, and performance against the 
development plan.  
1. Technological Risk 
One of the primary technological areas that increases risk associated with the 
CUAS program is component reliability while conducting operations in an austere 
environment. Operating in Afghanistan will be challenging for the CUAS due to the 
climate, terrain, and availability of maintenance.  
2. Threat Risk 
Once in theater, the CUAS will most likely face real threats that were not able 
to be simulated during the test and evaluation (T&E) period prior to deployment. 
With this said, the main threat that we envision is a credible man portable air 
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prove to be susceptible to small arms fire and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 
attacks. This may result in high attrition rates, which could prove to be a major factor 
in the overall program cost. This will influence the number of CUAS required to 
complete a mission, as well as the locations where CUAS can be utilized.  
3. Performance Risk 
Because CUAS is a new technology, there is a risk that the CUAS will not be 
able to meet all specific mission requirements held by the Marines on the ground 
while deployed in Afghanistan. From an employment standpoint, the main potential 
issue is a steep learning curve between the Marines being supported and the 
operators of the CUAS. There will need to be clear lines of communication while the 
CUAS is used for logistical resupply. Requirements will need to be stated up front 
and operating units requiring support will need to remain flexible while CUAS 
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
A. Results of Analysis 
1. Findings 
One of the major cost drivers in our analysis is the value of human life. All 
baseline and alternative solutions were based on the value of a human life being 
$6,000,000. As stated in Chapter III, the cost of human life could be considered far 
too much or far too little, depending on different individuals’ opinions. This figure is 
based on life insurance, survivor benefits, loss of earnings, lost human capital, and 
welfare lost to society. The DoD does not publically place a value on human life. 
However, other U.S. government agencies do place a value on human life. For 
example, the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration 
use $3 million, the Environmental Protection Agency uses $6.1 million, the Food and 
Drug Administration uses $6.5 million and the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission uses $5 million (Silny, Little, & Remer, 2010). All of these values are 
based on year 2006 U.S. dollars and were used as a reference for the $6 million 
value.  
Due to the subjective nature of the value of human life, a sensitivity analysis 
on this value was conducted. In our analysis, we systematically lowered the cost of a 
human life from $6,000,000 to $0 in $500,000 increments. In the course of this 
project, our sensitivity analysis concluded that human life would need to be valued 
below $2 million before ground convoys are less expensive to use than K-MAX. 
As stated above, there is a disparity among the agencies regarding the values 
placed on human life ranging from $3 million to $6.5 million. However, all of these 
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2. Meaning 
By not using K-MAX, more Marines will be exposed to risk, which will result in 
some loss of life based on the statistics found by JIEDDO. When human life is 
valued at $1,500,000, one ground convoy is used, replacing all but four K-MAX 
sorties and utilizing all CH-53E and KC-130J sorties. Based on JIEDDO statistics, 
this will result in six Marines being KIA per year. When human life is valued at $0, 
three ground convoys, seven CH-53E sorties, four KC-130J sorties, and four K-MAX 
sorties are used. Based on JIEDDO statistics, this will result in 15 Marines KIA per 
year. Of note, JIEDDO statistics were based solely on Iraq ground convoy 
operations. These KIA findings are most likely a low estimate for operations in 
Afghanistan. 
3. Proposed Way Ahead 
Based on our analysis, K-MAX is an attractive alternative to current methods 
of resupply. These findings led to our conclusion that the K-MAX is a program 
worthy of DoD investment and becoming a program of record. 
B. Comparative Advantages of Resupply Platforms 
1. Ground Convoys 
Through our research we found that both medium and high ground security 
convoys are ideal for resupply missions (all classes of supply) that are comprised of 
short distances and high pound requirements for the respective FOBs. Due to their 
large payload capacity (64,200 pounds and 85,600 pounds, respectively), ground 
convoys are able to accomplish a large percentage of resupply missions, but this 
comes at a significant price when risk exposure and the cost of human life are 
factored in.  
2. CH-53E 
Through the course of our research, it was apparent that the CH-53E utilizing 
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the CH-53E’s extensive payload capacity (17,125 pounds), its ingress speed to the 
FOB, and its proven capability in austere operating environments dating back to the 
early 1970s. 
3. KC-130J 
Through our research it was evident that the KC-130J utilizing JPADS is an 
ideal resupply platform for Class III (fuel). This is due to the KC-130’s large internal 
payload capacity (35,000 pounds) and the precision guided employment of JPADS. 
The KC-130J payload capacity would be fully utilized if it were able to land at the 
respective FOBs, but the scenarios we used in this project called for the KC-130J to 
fully utilize JPADS to conduct resupply missions, therefore the effective payload 
capacity was decreased to 14,000 pounds. 
4. K-MAX CUAS 
Our research indicated that the K-MAX CUAS is an ideal resupply platform for 
small or compact deliveries, most likely in the form of Class I (subsistence). As was 
discussed in Chapter IV, with the use of K-MAX CUAS, ground convoys can be 
completely eliminated and reduce transportation costs to $743,517. This alternative 
illustrates the fact that an all-air method resupply has the potential to be an attractive 
solution in large part due to the K-MAX’s large payload capacity (4,915 pounds).  
5. A160T Hummingbird CUAS 
As stated in Chapter IV, the A160T simply lacks the payload capacity to be a 
significant player in our scenario (its maximum payload is 1,250 pounds), and it 
increases the total transportation cost quite significantly. Through our research, we 
did come to the conclusion that the A160T may serve a vital role in a niche 
replenishment scenario. Specifically, we envision the A160T as having potential to 
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C. Source of Second Thoughts: Vulnerabilities for CUAS 
If there is a significant variability in resupply operations in theater, we should 
expect changes in enemy tactics because the Afghanistan insurgents are 
opportunistic, aggressive, and constantly improving their tactics. Just as IEDs are a 
useful countermeasure for ground convoys, we should expect an expanded range of 
countermeasures against aerial resupply if that mode of resupply becomes more 
widely employed for Coalition logistics. 
The main threat or vulnerability that we envision the CUAS encountering 
while making terminal deliveries to FOBs is the possibility of a credible, man-
portable air defense attack. Specifically, it may prove to be susceptible to small arms 
fire and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. This may result in high attrition 
rates, which could prove to be a major factor in the overall program cost. In addition, 
this threat has the potential to lead to complications in employing this platform in 
existing CONOPS. Ultimately, this threat will influence the number of CUAS required 
to complete a mission, as well as the locations where CUAS can be effectively 
utilized.  
As stated previously, the MQ-9 Reaper was used as a baseline for attrition 
rate computation. Due to the flexibility of our model, we were able to manipulate the 
baseline attrition rate to conduct an additional sensitivity analysis. However, we had 
to increase the attrition rate by a multiple of 38 for ground convoys to become less 
expensive to operate than the K-Max. Having to increase the attrition rate this 
drastically is unrealistic because it would result in 418 K-Max losses per year. 
D. Recommendations for Follow-On Research 
1. CUAS Operations and Support Costs 
Throughout the course of our research, we utilized the MQ-9 Reaper to 
compute the CUAS operations and support costs because data was not readily 
available for the K-MAX and A160T CUAS. As stated previously, this void in data 
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becomes a more mature concept and as data is generated in Afghanistan, additional 
research should be conducted with respect to the true operations and support costs 
of CUAS. 
2. CUAS Attrition Rates 
As stated in Chapter III, we utilized the MQ-9 Reaper to compute the CUAS 
attrition rates because data was not readily available for the K-MAX and A160T 
CUAS. As stated earlier in our comments with respect to the operations and support 
cost, as data is generated in Afghanistan, additional research should be conducted 
in regards to the true attrition rates for CUAS. 
3. Classes of Supply 
Throughout the course of our research, we focused solely on the total pounds 
required per FOB vice breaking the requirements down by classes of supply. We 
feel it would be beneficial to take a closer look at the specific requirements for each 
FOB by classes of supply. By utilizing this methodology of explicitly focusing on the 
classes of supply, even more vital roles may be found in which it would be beneficial 
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